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Banging the Other Side of the Saucepan:  
Changing Political Activism and Performance of Citizenship among Argentina’s 
Middle Class 2001-13 
 




Between May 2012 and April 2013 Argentina’s urban centres bore witness to several enormous 
anti-government protests. Led by sectors of the middle class1, these actions marked the return 
of this historically important and mobilised political actor to the nation’s centre stage on a scale 
not seen since the 2001-02 social uprisings.  
 
This chapter explores changes and continuities in patterns of middle-class citizens’ political 
activism and their performance of citizenship, class, race and nationality between these two 
moments. Based upon an ethnographic study including observation and interviews with 
primarily non-activist citizens in 2011 (during the months leading up to the following year’s 
protests), it seeks to comprehend how research participants made sense of their citizenship and 
the rights it bestowed. It explores their perceptions of their own position vis-à-vis other social 
sectors and how they believed that aspects of their rights were being violated. How these 
understandings influenced their political engagement and how these potentially informed the 
2012 mass anti-government protests is examined, drawing out comparisons with the literature 




The Middle Class and the 2001-02 Protests  
 
The 2001-02 uprising occurred within the context of Argentina’s most serious economic and 
political crisis in history. This included a debt default, mass unemployment of 25 percent and 
the pauperisation of seven million middle-class citizens (INDEC database). Whilst it was a 
popular multi-sectoral revolt, it was characterised by widespread participation from the middle 
class.2 Citizens’ faith in the institutions of representative democracy collapsed and the demand 
¡que se vayan todos! [get rid of them all!] encapsulated the zeitgeist of the time. There was 
widespread recognition that the neoliberal model of President Carlos Menem (1989-99) and 
then Fernando De La Rua’s (1999-2001) governments had been a disaster and that the 
corruption-ridden, representative democratic system had been exhausted. Bourgeoning protest 
movements sought to replace this model with a fairer, more participatory society based around 
social solidarity (Adamovsky, 2009). Millions of middle-class citizens engaged in radical, self-
organised, non-party political collective experiments in participatory democracy and horizontal 
decision-making such as neighbourhood assemblies, participatory budgeting, cultural 
movements and barter clubs. Through these actions a concerted attempt was made to transform 
society for the benefit of all.  
 
Narratives of contention and the performance of class were represented in popular chants, 
cacerolazos [saucepan protests] and in the neighbourhood assemblies’ discourse. These 
focused around solidarity with “the other”; in particular between progressive elements of the 
middle class and structurally poor and working-class movements, including the piqueteros3 
[road-blockers] (Svampa and Corral, 2006). 
 
Historically, Argentina enjoyed the largest, most politically-influential middle class in Latin 
America. Several waves of European immigration established an upwardly mobile and 
aspirational population during the early-twentieth century. General Juan Perón’s government 
(1946-55) enacted income redistribution policies and free university education which aided the 
sentiment of belonging to the middle class at the time. The legacy is that almost nine in ten 
Argentinians believe they are so today (UP-TNS Gallup, 2015). Yet this falls to 47% if income 
is taken as a measure of class using the World Bank’s US$ 10 per day criteria (CCR, 2015). If 
a Marxist definition is applied (managers, property owners and the supervisors of exploitation), 




“Born out of politics” as a reaction to the rise of Perón and his Justicialista (Peronist) 
movement (Adamovsky, 2009), elements of the ruling elites took fright at how as an anti-
clerical, nationalising President, he strengthened labour rights and wages and encouraged the 
industrial working class to strike against large employers. In response, these elites responded 
with attempts to co-opt sectors of the working class and dilute the subaltern resistance by 
imbuing in them a middle-class identity via their influence in mass media and cultural 
institutions. Modernisation theory was advanced, promoting ideals of “progress”, “whiteness” 
and “decency.” Peronism was conveyed as creating indiscipline, immorality, laziness, violence 
and backwardness, similarly to the anti-egalitarian discourses discussed by Shakow (this 
volume). Following the Revolución Libertadora [Freedom Revolution] civil-military uprising 
which eventually overthrew Peron in 1955, the state expanded its attempts to create the idea of 
“the middle-class Argentinian”. Underlying racial prejudices were also seized upon by elites, 
inventing the “threat” of the Mestizo shantytown-dwelling poor (Guano, 2004). Symbolic 
violence began to permeate everyday language and elite culture. Simultaneously, the 19th 
century “civilisation vs barbarism” dichotomy, immortalised by the writings of former 
Argentinian President Domingo Sarmiento, was evoked to pit the former as the national project 
of “progress” against the forces of backwardness among this newly-conscious middle class 
(Adamovsky, 2009). 
 
Curiously, as with the 2012-13 protests, this fervent opposition to Peronism emerged among 
many who had gained economically from its governments. Here lay the origins of a deep social 
fissure (la grieta) that pitted Peronism vs Radicalism, “Barbarism vs Civilisation”, 
“Europeanism vs Latin Americanism” and the “Mestizo vs White”, representing two distinct 
visions of national projects that continue to prevail today.  
 
Several arguments have been forwarded to explain middle-class participation in the 2001-02 
protests. Schamis (2002) argues that the legacy of a weak post-dictatorship “delegative 
democracy” allowed 1990s Menemismo to bolster subnational authoritarianism via provincial 
caudillos. Flourishing corruption and nepotism then led to anger around the failures of political 
representation by 2001 (Schamis, 2002).  
 
Onuch (2014) argues that the infringement of civil rights in the context of politico-economic 
crises crossed a collective threshold of political patience, together with the internal division of 
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elites, involvement from foreign actors, as well as the intensification of activist protests in 
general.  
 
Others posit that middle-class mobilisiation was strongly influenced by the national imaginary 
(Ozarow, 2014; Armony and Armony, 2005). During the 1990s the meaning of “belonging to 
the middle class” was reconfigured as citizenship became more closely associated with 
capacity for consumption (rather than occupation or education) when the government’s 1991-
2001 Convertibility model tied the value of the peso to the US Dollar. This made it relatively 
much more affordable to purchase imported consumer durables, cars, computers, mobile 
phones and take foreign holidays. The government and media claimed that Argentina had 
become a “middle-class country” with the population able to enjoy purchasing power on a par 
with their European or North American counterparts.  
 
Yet following the country’s debt default and currency devaluation when Convertibility 
suddenly ended, this myth of being middle class, and the country having fulfilled its “historic 
destiny” of national greatness were exposed. Purchasing power was decimated and mass 
unemployment and impoverishment expanded into the middle class.  
 
The disparity between raised material hopes and the inability to fulfil them in practice, is 
arguably what sparked the outbreak of mass protest in 2001 and is described by James Davies 
in When Men Revolt and Why (1971) as a prime factor in explaining social uprisings. That 
movement sought to “indict” those in the political elites who had deceived them.  
 
But what of the notion of “being middle class” and its ability to advancecollective demands- in 
Argentina? In reality both in 2001 and historically, it has proved to be more of an obstacle to 
collective action and has rarely been used as a framing mechanism to mobilise this class. Some 
analyses understood 2001 to be a defensive response to rapid downward mobility for fear of 
social descent and eventual proletarianisation (Ollier 2003). Under this interpretation, action in 
solidarity with other social actors was purely to avoid sinking into the working class. Yet 
contrary evidence suggests that much of the cross-class solidarity at the time was not defensive 
but idealistic, extending far beyond and outliving the collective protests. Many lower middle-
class neighbourhood assemblies were precisely those that most vehemently defended the poor 
and workers’ resistances (Svampa and Corral, 2006). A study by Nueva Mayoría (2006) 
showed that 40 percent of assembly members hailed from the middle class. Yet they never 
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specifically called for their own class’ defence, instead supporting all sectors who had suffered 
since the crisis.  
 
As a collective identity, middle-classnessis usually expressed covertly in public protest, as 
explicit attempts at promoting the defence of the “middle class” have proved disastrous. For 
instance the Middle-Class Movement in 1956 only ever had three hundred members. It was run 
by members of the upper class, failed to make any impression and folded within a year 
(Adamovsky, 2009). In 2001-02, assemblies and movements largely avoided referring to the 
middle class in communiques and discourse, with appeals instead more often being made to 
“the people.” Participants self-identified as “neighbours” (Svampa and Corral, 2006).  
 
This distinction between the public performance of class, which was expressed through 
association with “the people” in 2001, and the strong private attachment to a “middle-class” 
identity which endured the crisis (two-thirds of Argentinians maintained such self-
identification despite their unemployment or pauperisation (Grimson, 2005)), seems 
contradictory. However to understand it we must return to the intersectionality between nation 
and class in Argentina. Dating back to the time of General Juan Perón, “the worker” was 
extolled along with the mythological pueblo argentino [Argentinian people] and this became 
embedded in the national psyche. Political parties of all descriptions have since tended to avoid 
directing their campaigns at any one specific social group or class. The notion of the “middle 
class” has since adopted anti-popular connotations.  
 
Nevertheless during the 2001 crisis, for the first time since the 1950s there were some explicit 
attempts to both mobilise and placate the middle class as a collective entity. At the level of elite 
politics, (Peronist leader) Eduardo Duhalde began defending the middle class in his 2001 
speeches. In Mendoza, the Middle Class Housing Plan was enacted. The Argentinian 
Confederation of Medium-Sized Companies (CAME) began to openly call for a rebellion “in 
defence of the impoverished middle class” in December 2001 (Adamovsky, 2009, 449). The 
short-lived Middle-Class Defence Front was formed in Rosario and in leading daily, Página 
12 the cartoon strip, “Rep” openly called upon readers to join a middle-class revolt 
(Adamovsky, 2009).  
 
This return of “the middle class” as a mobilising identity can only be explained by the 
overwhelming fear many citizens felt when faced with an enormous scale of proletarianisation. 
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Social movements and elite actors were confronted with choices about whether this fear 
outweighed the risks of using an “anti-popular” discourse. Those like the CAME decided in 
favour of explicitly promoting their own perceived class interests, whilst the assembly 
movements tended to opt against.  
 
Whether the middle-class was capable of achieving transformative change through their 
demand-making at the time is doubtful if one refers to a “community psychology” approach, 
as it highlights differences in how struggling middle class and structurally impoverished 
communities confronted their respective situations (Saforcada et al, 2007). Among shantytown 
and working-class barrio residents, internal solidarity and their associated movements like the 
piqueteros or assemblies in poorer neighbourhoods outlasted the crisis. Yet those in the middle 
class who suffered rather sudden pauperisation, after the initial few months of political revolt 
tended to slide back towards private coping strategies, and social solidarity broke down. This 
was due to a deep-rooted individualism and belief in self-sufficiency and individual freedom, 
as well as growing preoccupations about crime and the sanctity of their private property. Their 
contingent demands for systemic change also rapidly faded and most eventually capitulated to 
supporting the reformist Kirchner government of 2003 (Mazzoni, 2008). The conservatism of 
many in the middle class was highlighted by a wave of high-profile kidnappings, including the 
murder of student Axel Blumberg, concerns which generated a sizable protest movement 
during the Blumberg demonstrations of 2004 and 2006. These attracted a strong middle-class 
presence around the authoritarian demands for harsher penal laws, a transfer of power to the 
police and security forces and a repressive clamp-down on crime. This prevented those outside 
the progressive wing of the middle class from creating an organised and sustained political 
response to the crisis of political legitimacy (Ozarow, 2012).   
 
Mazzoni (2008, 219) describes the struggling middle class as “low-impact citizens” due to their 
advanced political critique and the intensity of their verbal demands, yet limited expectations 
of their social and economic citizenship (what the state should provide for them). Their 
commitment to actually taking the necessary political action to change things was limited to 
voting due to their minimalist understanding of citizenship. Despite the crisis of representation 
they continued to demonstrate subordination towards their political representatives. 
 
Certainly class was an important factor in the performance of contentious politics during 2001-
02 and one that determined which repertoires of protest were adopted. Among the range of 
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movements, the piqueteros were understood to be a movement of the unemployed, who 
demanded food, work, housing and social welfare plans. The worker-recovered companies’ 
movement were largely blue-collar and trade union marches were often stigmatised due to their 
bureaucracies’ complicity with or capitulation to prior neoliberal governments. However, the 
neighbourhood assemblies were a more attractive proposition for many of the middle class, 
seen as a more acceptable and sophisticated form of subversion. Through this tool of direct 
democracy, the nation’s political, economic and social problems were discussed and 
intellectualised in mass gatherings in open public spaces as an affront to the delegitimised 
national ruling class. The performance of middle-class discontent in 2001-02, often in the form 
of cacerolazos, was depicted by the media and academic studies as “spontaneous”, 
“autonomous” of political parties, “peaceful”, and territorialised in the neighbourhood vicinity. 
Thus, the pots and pans protests soon came to also symbolise middle-class resistance during 
subsequent protests in Argentina, like the 2004 Blumberg demonstrations, the 2008 
“Countryside Conflict,” and again in the 2012-13 anti-government demonstrations, as they did 
in Iceland, Spain and Greece in their respective middle class-led uprisings in 2011-12. Carrying 
saucepans during protests allowed citizens to express their anger with the government, whilst 
saving face regarding any personal financial difficulties they were experiencing. Through the 
cacerolazos they could enunciate their individual middle-class identity through a distinct 
protest repertoire which distinguished them from trade union, blue-collar or unemployed 
citizens’ groups   
 
The fieldwork study 
 
Six months of fieldwork in Argentina were conducted from March to August 2011. Several 
research methods were triangulated. The author conducted participant observation in middle-
class citizens’ local communities, their working and social lives, noting and interpreting the 
systems of meanings participants attached to a variety of research themes mentioned in the 
introduction. 
 
Concurrently, interviews were conducted with 30 middle-class citizens (12 men and 18 
women) in Spanish. Six were aged 20-29, six 30-39, four 40-49, ten 50-59 and four 60+. Only 
three were political activists. Because of the timing of the research, these individuals did not 
necessarily take part in the 2012 protests. Rather the opinions and attitudes expressed by those 
in the sample are assumed to provide clues to the underlying individual and collective 
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grievances that provided the grounds for the anti-government protests which followed a few 
months later, when the largely middle-class protestors were able to mobilise sufficient 
resources to take action as described in Resource Mobilisation Theory (McCarthy and Zald, 
1977). The interview responses and observations were then analysed thematically and 
comparisons drawn with the literature on middle-class citizens’ activism and performance of 
citizenship during the 2001-02 protests. 
 
Participants were selected for interview from a market-research agency database if they a) held 
a professional qualification, owned a small business or had a university degree (or were 
currently studying for one); b) owned their home (or were adult children of those who did) and 
c) worked in a profession, highly-skilled job or ran a business (or were adult children of those 
who did), indicating their middle-class status based on a pre-interview questionnaire. Self-
selection problems were avoided as only one qualifying participant declined to be interviewed. 
Home visits were made to gentrified districts of five large cities –Buenos Aires, La Plata, 
Rosario, Santa Fe and Posadas– and Piedras Blancas, a rural village in Entre Rios Province. 




The Middle Class and the 2012-13 Protests 
 
In contrast to the 2001 rebellion, middle-class participants in the mass protests of 2012 
abandoned the hope of achieving a wide-ranging societal transformation. The movement goals 
of solidarity and the construction of new democratic, participatory and horizontal economic 
and political structures were replaced by a narrower focus on indicting reformist-Peronist 
President Cristina Kirchner who they accused of corruption and authoritarianism. Internal 
enemies such as “the poor” were blamed for the nation’s problems, replacing the entire political 
establishment, globalisation and the IMF who were deemed responsible in 2001-02 (Ozarow, 
2012). Materialistic concerns, such as ending inflation and currency controls, became key 
demands in 2012. As with 2001, the protests themselves remained non-party political, self-
organised and centred on the cacerolazos. However, this time they occurred during a period of 
comparative economic stability, low unemployment and amidst acute political polarisation. 
While the objectives were very different, the protests symbolised that many of the 
preoccupations of 2001, such as a perceived lack of democratic accountability, corruption and 
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lack of faith in the political establishment, had remained unresolved (Svampa, 2012). Whilst 
middle-class participation in both sets of protests was significant, there was a higher presence 
of upper middle-class citizens in 2012 compared to 2001.  
 
As a heterogeneous actor both socio-economically and also politically, there were of course 
many within the middle class who supported the objectives of both movements, neither of 
them, and one or the other. However some generalisations can be inferred.  
 
 
Citizenship as “an occasional identity” 
 
Certain parallels can be drawn in the interviewees’ 2011 dominant discourses which suggest 
continuities with those reported in 2001-02. Almost all participants expressed disdain for 
politicians, parties and politics in general, understanding them to have violated their sense of 
political citizenship and associating them with “corruption” and “dirt”. Among the over-40s 
this tended to engender a sense of powerlessness. Eight confessed that although they had 
supported the idea of Que se vayan todos in 2001, the fact that many of the same faces had 
returned to the political scene and corruption continued made them feel resigned and actually 
demobilised them from political activity. For younger Argentinians this acted as a motivator to 
engage in political activism such as protest blackouts or to participate in social movements 
such as the Frente Popular Darío Santillán or political parties like the Socialist Party. 
 
Another important continuity was the perceived ongoing crisis of representation from 2001. 
Most (22) interview participants struggled to mention a current politician they felt represented 
them. Only a handful did so, citing Cristina Kirchner or then-opposition Deputy Elisa Carrió 
among others. More often historical figures like Perón, Che Guevara or radical Presidents like 
Alfonsín (1983-89) or Frondizi (1958-62) were referenced. The lack of faith in political 
institutions extended to the trade unions, which half the sample viewed negatively. They were 
often described as “mafias”. A minority of five expressed that they felt represented by 
charities, the Church, media or their trade union. 
 
An interesting paradox was observed. Despite the near universal sense of anti-politics, the act 
of voting continued to be central to middle-class citizens’ understanding of their citizenship. 
This was true even among those who were the most scathing of politicians or could be 
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categorised as “apolitical”. The liberal model of political citizenship tends to be hegemonic in 
contemporary constitutional democracies. Citizens restrict themselves to entrusting the 
business of law-making to representatives rather than engaging actively (Walzer, 1989). This 
notion was found to be almost universally accepted among the sample. With the exception of 
three cases, collective protest engagement was minimal, with the widely-advocated 2001 
notion of participatory democracy now deemed unworkable. I term how participants relate to 
their citizenship as an “occasional identity”.  
 
To some extent the Kirchner governments since 2003 had attempted to implement some of the 
demands of the 2001 uprisings, especially for more active citizen participation in political and 
economic decision-making in the nation’s institutions. The application of more republican 
notions of citizenship to policy-making through their National-Popular project are exemplified 
by the creation of the 2004 National Institute for the Associative and Social Economy, support 
for worker-recovered enterprises and cooperatives (Ozarow and Croucher, 2014) and the 2014 
National Programme for Participatory Budgeting.  
 
However these republican conceptualisations of citizenship had little resonance among 
interviewees, only a couple of whom mentioned participation in such projects. Historical 
factors such as the legacy of the dictatorship -meaning they valued the act of voting even if 
there was no candidate or party they believed in- were commonly cited, as was the fear that not 
voting would lead to anarchy (understood as a breakdown of order and threat to their property). 
Several participants (12) described voting as the “least worst option” (mal menor).  
 
The political class is a necessary evil because when all is said and done yes there is corruption but 
they bring a certain order to things. Even the way they are corrupt is orderly! Without them, well we’d 
be halfway towards anarchy no? [Laughs].  
Brian, 37, Rosario 
  
Half of the sample (15) mentioned that although they always make sure that they vote, they 
doubted that voting would change anything. Abstention or ballot-spoiling was seen as 
maintaining the status quo, in contrast to 2001 when one fifth of voters spoiled their legislative 




I am going to struggle to vote this year … We have to vote for somebody… Spoiling my vote? That’s 
not the solution either. In reality we shouldn’t vote for anyone but we haven’t done that en masse since 
2001 so we aren’t going to change things that way. 
Lucía, 63, Posadas 
 
Six participants were somewhat conspiratorial, explaining that the winners were pre-
determined. 
 
But I don’t really care who I vote for. That’s the most pathetic thing. I don’t care… because it’s all 
fixed anyway.  
         Jorge, 36, La Plata  
 
There was a general feeling that they were being represented badly and that most politicians of 
all persuasions were corrupt and self-serving. The only participants who spoke positively about 
politics were Matias (21) from Posadas, the son of a politician, and Martin (50), a resident of 
the rural village of Piedras Blancas who described politics as “beautiful”. In this village, 
national politicians were generally held in higher regard. Labels such as “corrupt”, “dirty” and 
“thieves” were less frequent in their discourse than among interviewees in the urban centres.  
 
Mazzoni’s notion of “low-impact citizens” (2008) still widely applied in 2011. Participants’ 
radical analyses of how society functions (often critical, anti-systemic, even Marxist) and their 
damning condemnations of their own subjugation were not matched by engagement in action 
to contest it.  Indeed some of the governments’ fiercest critics like the two below actually 
expressed the very anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist views that one can find in Kirchnerist 
discourse. Somehow the government was failing to win over those who should have been its 
natural allies. 
 
The main problem we have is one of dependence. All our riches are being stolen by the 
Americans… by the English.    
Luis, 57, Santa Fe 
 
The world’s wealth is owned by just 270 powerful men. Via their minions, the rest of us are 
exploited day after day. They will only stop us from rising up by giving us just about enough of 
the crumbs to survive.        





From passive dissidence to mobilisation 
 
Despite interviewees’ wholesale disdain for the political class, the act of “doing politics” was 
limited to the confines of “giving opinions”. Among the two-thirds of participants (19) who 
held negative views of the current Kirchner government, it was as if a cauldron of grievances 
was heating up that would explode at some point. Given the lack of political opportunities to 
join collective protests, assemblies or other contentious actions, many harboured feelings of 
resignation. Dissidence only manifested itself passively.  
 
I don’t believe that the people have any power….. They don’t have it. We have to make do with a 
system that grants us elections to vote for people who don’t represent us.  
Franco, 35, Posadas 
 
In addressing the question of what it would take for them to convert their citizenship from 
“passive” to “active” though participation in collective actions, interviewees insinuated that 
they lacked the belief things could change. To rebel without a critical mass would be pointless 
but also potentially risky. This participant used the following analogy:  
 
My relatives in the USA always ask me “why I don’t rebel?” Well there is a certain degree of 
impotence. Imagine that you are herding cows, sheep or whatever with dogs and whips. You bring 
them along with you and they all follow. None of the animals rebel because they know that the 
consequences of doing so would be immediate and dangerous. 
Carlos, 78, Buenos Aires 
 
“Self-sufficiency” appeared embedded in interviewees’ belief systems. They appeared reluctant 
to transform any economic grievances into action, but said that they were more likely to do so 
if civil or political rights were attacked or if motivated by a deep sense of injustice or moral 
cause. For instance Laura was critical of those whom in her opinion protested for “financial 
self-interest” (even citing the middle class in the 2001 cacerolazos) but then conceded that she 
would protest “if it were a question of human rights (…). Anything to do with the AMIA4, and 
I’m not even Jewish... or for the Disappeared5. I believe in the right to life… and human rights 




The exception to this, where the violation of social rights did ignite particular anger, was 
perceived intersectional gender and age discrimination. This was mentioned by all of the seven 
middle-aged women (50-65 years) in the sample. In a country where the gender pay gap was 
30% in 2011 (INDEC database), these grievances were justified. But curiously they were not 
transformed into collective action until the enormous Ni Una Menos [Not One Less] protests 
in 2015-16 when the gruesome femicides of teenagers Chiara Paez and Lucia Perez shocked 
the nation, galvanised activists and non-activists and raised awareness of the extent of domestic 
violence and other elements of gender inequality in society. 
 
Recalling Resource Mobilisation Theory, the conditions required for a social movement to 
emerge are where a shared understanding of grievances are combined with  the belief that they 
can be overcome (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). In daily interactions with middle-class citizens 
it was evident that there was growing awareness of the first part of this equation -widespread 
discontent. Dissident conversations in shops, on public transport or at social events about the 
declining state of society would be sprinkled with phrases such as “well, with the government 
we have…” However, during the research period, incumbent President Cristina Kirchner was 
leading by far in the polls, then actually won 48% of the vote in the August 2011 presidential 
primaries, some 35% ahead of her nearest rival (Dirección Nacional Electoral, 2011). Neither 
had there been any major anti-government protests for the preceding three years. 
 
For this reason the second element of the theory was virtually absent among critics of the 
government – the belief that they could bring about change.  Thus the fieldwork period seemed 
to mark a time of “testing the water” for many of those interviewed, experimenting with  how 
far their feelings were tolerated or shared through subtle comments in public exchanges -until 
such time that this became well-established on the streets the following year. 
 
The other factor that transformed this passive dissidence into mobilisation was that by 2012, 
oppositional actors had established diagnostic framing processes (Benford and Snow, 2000) 
that blamed the President for middle-class citizens’ underlying sense of political neglect. For 
instance, Jorge Lanata’s fiercely anti-government TV show, Periodismo Para Todos 
[Journalism for Everyone] (principally watched by a middle-class audience), launched in 2012 
and quickly gained millions of viewers just weeks before the first anti-government 
mobilisations. His show launched several investigations into alleged government corruption 
and mocked and demonised the President and her aides. It thus helped such citizens to 
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understand that their grievances were shared by millions of others, legitimised their discontent, 
and gave them the confidence to join collective action organised via social media in 2012. 
 
 
Victimisation as “neglected citizens” and retreatism  
 
In seeking to answer the demands of the 2001-02 uprisings and of social movements such as 
the piqueteros, Kirchnerismo used state benefits and workfare programmes to extend social 
and economic citizenship rights to previously excluded sectors, such as the unemployed, 
informal workers and the poorest sectors of society. This post-neoliberal ethos (Wylde, 2016) 
distinguished them from traditional Peronist governments which had focused social coverage 
on formally-employed labour. However, an unintended consequence of these policies was that 
many of the middle-class interview participants (who fell outside the scope of these plans) felt 
abandoned or neglected and thought that the values they held dear were under attack. 
        
Many also expressed a yearning to recover the material prosperity that they had enjoyed under 
Convertibility in the 1990s. Of these eroding values, almost half the participants (14) 
complained that it was impossible to use socially acceptable means to achieve their desired 
living standards, although this was less pronounced among the young adults (two of the six 
under 30 years old). Older participants felt futility and despair, as their values of honesty and 
hard work were deemed to hold little currency in 2011. This had politically demobilising 
consequences. Almost all (23) mentioned how they felt Argentina’s meritocratic society 
(another strongly-held middle-class conviction) had been replaced by one which rewarded 
laziness, violence or corruption. Nicolas (49, Buenos Aires) exclaimed: “It’s as if here there is 
a mentality whereby an honest person is seen as a fool while the one who screws everyone else 
is admired”. 
 
Responding to this Durkheimian anomie and a perceived breakdown of social norms, 
several adopted what Merton (1968) described as “retreatism” (rejecting the cultural goal of 
success and socially legitimate means of achieving it).  “Retreatism” had a distinct political 
dimension among research participants because such reactions linked their fates to perceived 
discrimination against “middle-class citizens”.  About two-thirds of participants insinuated 
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that traditionally excluded sectors of society were favoured by the existing Peronist 
government as its traditional and natural electoral constituency. They criticized the 
supposedly “generous” welfare and unemployment benefits and governing politicians’ 
impunity despite alleged crimes.   As Shakow (this volume) explains, similar views were held 
by emerging middle-class Bolivians, who felt that the governments’ egalitarian social policies 
in support of the poor devalued their own efforts to build a career, rewarding laziness instead.  
 
If they insist on giving the poor social plans, I don’t understand why they don’t also look to support 
the middle class, or say “we’ll do all we can to find you work”. Because unlike them [the poor] we 
don’t sit here with our arms crossed waiting for money from above.  
Sofia, 31, Santa Fe 
 
Carolina echoes this sentiment and ominously predicts a social revolt:  
 
Something is going to explode at any moment. This government is giving out money, left, right and 
centre; Take, take, take from the hardworking taxpayers. They are the ones who will rebel sometime 
soon because they are fed up with paying so that others can live for free. 
 
          23, Piedras Blancas 
 
 
Feeling their social position increasingly threatened “from below” as traditional markers of 
social distinction (income, value of educational qualifications, recent job status, savings) had 
eroded since the 2001 crisis, interviewees found it difficult to describe how they were distinct 
from the “working class” or “traditional poor”. The blurring of inter-class boundaries is not a 
new phenomenon, but intensified after 2001 when the real-terms salaries of those with 
university degrees fell by 26%, yet those with only primary education increased by 5% (INDEC 
database). 
 
Cross-class social trust had diminished since 2001 and two thirds (20) of research participants 
saw themselves as “victims” of the Kirchner (Peronist) government that was historically 
supportive of the non-European, Mestizo and descamisado. 6  Respondents evoked deep 
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historical social fissures in Argentinian society that manifest themselves in the form of 
symbolic racialised violence against internal “enemies” – the poor and the piqueteros, the same 
groups with whom many had marched on the streets a decade earlier.  
 
 
The “other” as the bad citizen 
 
Interviewees framed themselves as “good citizens” whilst the crime-committing, road-
blocking, “work-shy” poor were characterised as “bad”. 
  
14 out of the 30 interviewees identified “insecurity” (crime) caused by the poor as their main 
preoccupation. Surveys at the time indicated that over a quarter of Argentinians had been the 
victim of crime or violence. However, the perception of insecurity was up to three times higher 
than the reality (UCA, 2010). Television news, talk shows and newspaper headlines 
emphasized “insecurity” in society, and research participants referred to a combination of these 
stories and friends,’ family members’ or (less commonly) their own experiences when 
discussing their fears. Media usually depicted poor, dark-skinned immigrants from surrounding 
Andean countries or local shantytowns as perpetrators.   
 
These tapped into deep-seated fears of “the other” among many middle-class residents. Other 
researchers (Guano, 2004, see also Shakow in this volume) have explored how middle-class 
citizens seek to counter the fading social differences between themselves and the structural 
poor by articulating a consensus on how national modernity is threatened by the illegitimate 
incursion of the Mestizo poor into middle-class districts and the unjust extension of undeserved 
civil rights. 
 
However, by 2011 the notion of the “bad citizen” appeared to have become uncritically 
accepted (or what Gramsci terms “common sense”) by those in the interview sample. Consent 
to be ruled by the existing order could therefore be perpetuated, as even those who had once 
allied with the indigent poor during the 2001-02 rebellion now viewed them with suspicion.  
 
It’s terrifying these days. Maybe it’s due to all the foreigners in the country. There are loads here from 
Paraguay, Bolivia and Colombia. It’s full! 




Today it’s a struggle between social classes. You can’t take anything new with you without someone 
pulling a gun on you and threatening to kill you for two pesos. Today that is how things are. You have 
to keep your wits about you. It’s complete insecurity.  
        Vanesa, 26, La Plata 
 
Participants often applied ethnic (immigrant/race) and class-based (poor/lower-class) 
characterisations interchangeably to describe this group whom they felt threatened by. This 
was perhaps unsurprising given the conflation between “class” and racial origins in Argentina. 
A handful used overtly racist language about mestizo shantytown-dwellers which was typical 
of this confusion. Interestingly open xenophobia was expressed in equal measure regardless of 
age or gender. 
 
This country is made for either those who have a load of money or those blacks [negros] who 
have nothing. The guy who works hard and wants to progress in life has no chance. 
 
Jorge, 36, La Plata 
 
The characterisation of the bad citizen also extended to protest movements. Nine participants 
had been sympathetic or supportive of the piqueteros during the 2001 crisis but felt that their 
methods had lost “legitimacy”. Framed in “citizenship” terms, there was general agreement 
that the unemployed had the right to have their basic needs covered and to be provided with 
work, but not to receive state handouts. However, interviewees’ concern for  the piqueteros’ 
rights had since been superseded by anger that their own “right” to freely move around the city 
in order to exercise their right to work was being violated by constant roadblocks. One 
participant described their protest methods as “a revolutionary car tax against the middle class.” 
All but two participants were critical of them, this one being typical: 
 
What the piqueteros do… and I’m not saying that their demands aren’t just but the way that they make 
them… they annoy so many people who are working… What you are restricting is the right to freedom 
of transit.  
          Graciela, 50, Buenos Aires 
 
 




Argentinian history since 1955 testifies that change, be it the dominant political ideology or 
economic model, has only been possible with the tacit majority consensus or even mass 
mobilisation of the middle class, from the 1955 Revolución Libertadora uprising to the civil-
military coup in 1976,  to Menemismo in the 1990s, to the 2001-02 revolt.  
 
Middle-class involvement in the 2012-13 anti-government protests was significant, although 
less multi-sectoral than in 2001-02. The ethnographic study conducted here several months 
prior to their commencement suggests that some of the underlying grievances held by broad 
middle-class sectors became politicised and soon transformed into active mobilisation. Whilst 
these protests were not officially organised by any political party, and did not effect immediate 
change, they did set in motion a series of events in high politics which culminated in an attempt 
to answer many of their demands.  
 
Electoral opposition was completely divided in 2011, but the 2012-13 mobilisations revealed 
the existence of an oppositional grassroots movement that needed to be united at the ballot box. 
Headed by one of the protest movements’ most outspoken advocates, Elisa Carrió, initially a 
Broad Front (UNEN) alliance formed between the Civic Coalition (CC-ARI) and other parties 
that enjoyed significant middle-class support (including its historic electoral outlet, the UCR, 
and the Socialist Party). When this project was dissolved in mid-2015, enough headwind had 
been generated for CC-ARI and UCR to join Governor of Buenos Aires City Mauricio Macri’s 
Republican Proposal party to form Cambiemos [Let’s Change]. This alliance then came to 
power in December 2015 and presented the demands of the 2012-13 protests – ending 
corruption, inflation, crime and currency controls – as its flagship manifesto pledges.  
 
To this extent, Argentina’s middle class remains an important actor in the process of social 
change, providing their demands resonate with broader sections of society. The multi-sectoral 
alliance between the lower-middle class, organised labour, the indigent poor and the 
unemployed on the streets in 2001-02 eventually provided the electoral basis for Kirchnerismo. 
This began to disintegrate after 2011, and the 2012-13 movement led by the upper-middle class 
and supported by much of the non-progressive middle class and pockets of the poor morphed 




The study also revealed Argentina’s middle class’ understanding of citizenship to be limited to 
political and civil rights. Their strong belief in self-sufficiency minimalised expectations of 
social and economic rights for themselves and others. In terms of political mobilization, their 
liberal rather than republican understanding of citizenship made them much more sensitive to 
allegations of corruption, authoritarianism, human rights abuses and anti-liberalism than to 
poverty, unemployment, or even macroeconomic performance. The Kirchner government was 
performing well on all these latter respective indicators. 
 
Perceived political neglect linked to their middle-class identities held greater weight in 
generating mobilisation against the government, than economic wellbeing brought about by a 
decade of successive annual macroeconomic growth (bar 2009) of 6-10 percent (IMF) had in 
preventing it. Failing to recognise this was a strategic error of Cristina Kirchner’s government. 
 
Kirchnerismo enjoyed substantial popularity from broad sectors of the middle class early on 
when it was viewed as fulfilling individual and collective political demands in correspondence 
with cherished liberal and civil rights values: removing the Menemist judges, arresting former 
military leaders accused of genocide, promoting equal marriage, etcetera. Whilst their 
expectations of social protection from the state remained weak, the growing belief that 
structurally impoverished, unemployed, “non-deserved” and for some frankly “racially 
inferior” bad citizens were being lavished with state support, whilst “hardworking”, decent, 
white, “good” middle-class citizens were politically and socially neglected, prompted many to 
take collective action. These mobilisations were fuelled by the resurrection of historic 
prejudices and political fault-lines that aggravated existing anti-Peronist sentiment and 
opposition to a national project, embodied by the President, which they perceived to be 
diametrically opposed to their own vision of the country.  
 
This perceived injustice was understood well by Mauricio Macri, who was able to construct an 
alliance of political forces to form Cambiemos. Alongside a heavily supportive media, the way 
Macri tapped into these sentiments and values with subtle and covert imagery and messaging, 
seducing the middle class without alienating the rest of society or adopting an “anti-popular” 
discourse, was, , was key to his 2015 election success. Notions of emprendedorismo 
[entrepreneurism], “decency” and of “returning to the world” (meaning the “first world”, from 
which their immigrant grandparents came, by ending the Latin American regionalist policy and 
developing closer ties with the white, European and North American businesses and 
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governments) also attracted middle-class voters. Social movements and political parties on the 
left meanwhile have failed to capitalise on this framing in the same way and must learn this 
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1 Highly-educated professionals, middle managers, small business owners or skilled white-collar workers or 
who are home owners. 
2 One in five of those in the struggling middle class participated in the protests in the first six months of 2002 
alone (World Bank, 2002; Ozarow, 2014, 199). 
3 Unemployed workers’ movement 
4 The Jewish community centre that was blown up in a terrorist attack in 1994. 
5 The 30,000 victims of the 1976-83 civil-military dictatorship. 
6 “Shirtless”, refers to the traditional poor from whom Peronist governments built their supporter base. 
                                                          
